

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 33

THE NEW YORK TIMES  
21 June 1977

# Director, 'Czar' and President

By Tom Wicker

President Carter is now confronted with the necessity for two decisions, each of which is about as important as any he will make. He has to choose a new director for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, presumably from a list of five names submitted to him by a special commission; and he has to decide whether to appoint a single director for all the various agencies loosely known as "the intelligence community."

Probably no two officials—should Mr. Carter decide to name an "intelligence czar"—would have more power over the lives of individual Americans. And at that, their power often would be invisible or unrealized at the time by those affected, and not subject to political check by the voters—unless at one remove upon the man who appointed such powerful officials. And at least the F.B.I. chief, with his 10-year term, would serve more than one Administration.

Of the two choices Mr. Carter must make, picking the F.B.I. director is simple by comparison, though scarcely less important. Picking the right man—or woman should Mr. Carter choose someone other than the five commission nominees—is usually easier than devising the best institutional organization and procedures. These latter have an uncanny way of developing quite differently from what was intended by their architects.

Obviously, for the F.B.I., Mr. Carter needs a man whose performance will restore public confidence in an agency once ranked with Mother and the flag, but in recent years wracked by charges of illegal procedures, improper political surveillances and invasions of citizens' rights. Just as obviously, the new director will need to rebuild agent

Both tasks will be complicated by the forthcoming trial of a former agent—and perhaps others—on charges of having broken the law while supposedly enforcing it. Yet, that seems necessary to the third major task of a new director—bringing bureau operations under the rule of law, while keeping them out of partisan or ideological political control.

While it was in some ways disappointing, there is one good thing to be said for the rather surprising anonymity, outside their own communities, of the five men the commission suggested to Mr. Carter. None of them appears likely within a 10-year term to build himself into the kind of public monument Mr. Hoover became, with bureaucratic and political power that made him virtually unchallengeable even by Presidents.

Very much the same considerations apply to the proposal of Stansfield Turner, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, that the intelligence community—including the National Security Agency and the Defense and State Department intelligence units—should have a single chief unaffiliated with any of the component agencies. The difference is that Admiral Turner presumably would get the post; Mr. Carter has to decide on the organizational principle rather than pick the man.

Disclosures of C.I.A. misdeeds and illegal operations, plus some by the N.S.A., have given the whole intelligence community a bad name, and no doubt produced morale problems; so this, too, is a rebuilding job, both internally and externally. And as in the case of the F.B.I., the C.I.A. and the other intelligence agencies must be brought within the rule of law but not the control of politicians.

Both the F.B.I. and the intelligence agencies, not incidentally, may be facing much closer Congressional oversight than in the past. Senator Daniel Inouye has set a good example by announcing that he will resign after this year as the new Intelligence Committee chairman; a rotating chairmanship will help guard against co-option of the committee, which is engaged in writing new charters for the F.B.I.

Two objections to Admiral Turner's "czar" proposal are obvious. One is that such a prestigious and powerful position might produce another unchallengeable ikon in the Hoover and Allan Dulles mold; the other is that such a "czar" might suppress dissent and unorthodox views within the intelligence community, thus limiting the advice and information reaching the President.

But Senator Gary Hart, for one, believes from his work on the Intelligence Committee that the community probably has been speaking with too many voices, through too many channels. And the single-director concept does offer the possibility of more efficiency, greater control, less duplication and a more useful synthesis of all available intelligence information.

Mr. Carter should beware, however, of relying too much on his apparently high regard for Admiral Turner. There will be other directors in Administrations to come; so important a job, if it is created, should not be tailored to one man but to the intelligence needs of the nation.

## IN THE NATION

morale and restore the bureau's effectiveness as an investigative agency. For many years, owing mostly to the rigidities and political obsessions of J. Edgar Hoover, the F.B.I. simply has not been as good at its basic mission as it ought to be, or as it has